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This paper analyzes market discipline in a many-bank economy where contagion and bank runs interact.
We present a model with differently-informed depositors, where those depositors that are more
informed have incentives to monitor banks’ investments. It is shown that when banks are undercapital-
ized, and the probability of success of the risky asset is low, depositors might prefer a contract that is sub-
ject to bank runs in the interim period to a contract that allows banks to gamble with their funds and
maintain their investment.The results of the paper emphasize the beneﬁts of private monitoring of banks
in order to promote market discipline.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction and supervisory environment (see Fonseca and González, 2010;The recent ﬁnancial turmoil has restored the debate concerning
deposit insurance schemes. European governments have increased
depositors’ protection up to almost 100%, in an attempt to prevent
panic bank runs. Nevertheless, this policy was implemented before
knowing the real quality of banks’ assets. It is largely claimed that
these interventions will intensify the riskiness of banks’ invest-
ments and generate bankruptcies and contagion in the future. All
these events have called for a system of supervision that prevents
institutions from taking on excessive risk. Additionally, they have
highlighted that a sound transparency framework based on im-
proved disclosure and high quality accounting standards is essen-
tial in order to ensure market conﬁdence and enhance market
discipline.
Market discipline is one of the three pillars generally accepted
by regulators and scholars to limit the bank risk-shifting incentives
that are exacerbated by ﬁnancial safety nets. Nevertheless, the
incentives to acquire information and exercise market discipline
vary across countries and depend on the regulatory, institutionalCubillas et al., 2012).
There is empirical research that has documented that deposi-
tors exercise market discipline in banking, even in the presence
of deposit insurance. Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) study
the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s
and 1990s. They ﬁnd that depositors punish banks for risky behav-
ior, by both withdrawing their deposits and requiring higher inter-
est rates.1 Market discipline becomes more important after crises
and deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of
market discipline. Similar results are found by Hosono et al. (2005)
for the case of Asia. Hadad et al. (2011) analyze changes in the de-
posit-guarantee scheme and capital regulation in Indonesian banks
following the 1997–1998 ﬁnancial crisis. They ﬁnd that the adoption
of a blanket-guarantee scheme weakens market discipline, although
market discipline works better in listed banks than unlisted banks
and in foreign banks than domestic ones.
Additionally, recent papers have shown that market discipline
varies with the particular regulatory, supervisory, and institutional
environment. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)
analyze whether differences in market discipline across countries
can be explained by different designed features of ﬁnancial safetysince the
3 Bhattacharya et al. (1998) and Chen and Hasan (2006) also provide a discussion of
the optimality of partial deposit insurance and empirical evidence that supports it.
4 Qi (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2001a,b, 2005, 2006), also study the
disciplinary effects of liquid deposits in models that abstract from asymmetric
information.
5 Regarding the empirical literature on ﬁnancial contagion, most of these papers
A. Hasman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3076–3084 3077nets. In particular, they show that co-insurance, coverage of foreign
currency deposits, and private and joint management of insurance
schemes may improve market discipline. Cubillas et al. (2012) have
also analyzed to what extent variations in market discipline after a
banking crisis depend on a country’s bank regulation, supervision,
and institutions. They provide evidence that the adoption of an ex-
plicit blanket guarantee, forbearance, government recapitalization,
and nationalization programs are interventions that have a weak-
ening effect on market discipline.
The aim of this paper is to analyze market discipline and its ef-
fect on ﬁnancial contagion. This is a very important topic as it is
precisely during crises when governments tend to adopt blanket
guarantees to avoid runs (in fear of a systemic crisis) and thus
these policies weaken market discipline and increase bank risk tak-
ing in the future. Our results suggest that, in certain circumstances,
allowing for runs (and hence contagion) might be welfare superior
to maintaining risky banks operating. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the ﬁrst paper that analyzes market discipline in a
many bank economy where bank runs and contagion interact.
We model a two region economy, with a continuum of risk-
averse consumers (depositors) and risk-neutral investors (bank-
ers). Consumers have the standard Diamond–Dybvig preferences.
Banks in each region have access to illiquid long-term investment
projects, that allow depositors to increase their expected welfare.
In particular, at t = 0, banks can choose between a safe asset and
a risky one (the gambling asset) that yields a lower expected return
at t = 2. However, this gambling asset may become attractive when
banks are undercapitalized. At t = 1, some depositors acquire infor-
mation about the bank’s investments. In particular, these deposi-
tors may run on the bank, if the bank has invested in the
gambling asset. On the other hand, banks are fully rational and
are aware that depositors can obtain information. Hence, in order
to avoid a bank run in the interim period, the bank contract has
to be appropriately designed. We will refer to this contract as the
run-proof contract. We show that when banks are undercapitalized
(and hence, have incentives to take risk), depositors might prefer a
contract that is subject to bank runs in the interim period to a con-
tract that prevents runs and allow banks to gamble and maintain
their investment (run-proof contract), provided that the probability
of success of the gambling asset is low.2 Finally, it is assumed that
the two regions have negatively correlated liquidity shocks, and so
banks will maintain interbank linkages in order to ensure them-
selves against the liquidity shock. As a result, during a crisis, the fail-
ure of one institution may have negative effects on the other
institution to which it is linked (contagion).
In particular, we build on the model by Brusco and Castiglionesi
(2007), from now on BC, but we modify their framework by intro-
ducing the possibility of differently informed depositors. BC ana-
lyzed the propagation of ﬁnancial crises among regions affected
by moral hazard problems. In their paper, the existence of limited
liability and insufﬁciently capitalized banks promoted excessive
risk taking by banks. This lead to a situation where bankruptcy
(and contagion) occurred with positive probability at t = 2. In fact,
for certain parameter values, depositors preferred a contract that
allowed banks to gamble with their money to one that restricted
banks to be sufﬁciently capitalized, in order to avoid the moral
hazard problem. However, in the BC model there is no possibility
for depositors to acquire information. Therefore, in case there
would be such possibility, their implicit assumption is the presence
of full deposit insurance.
We depart from BC by considering the possibility of acquiring
information. In our model a fraction of uninsured depositors2 Alonso (1996) and Samartín (2003) ﬁnd similar results but in a single-bank
economy where contagion effects cannot be considered.receive information about the bank’s investment and may run on
the bank. However, runs are not necessarily bad from an ex-ante
point of view. Depositors will only allow banks to gamble with
their money and maintain their investment, when the probability
of success of the gambling asset is sufﬁciently high (the asset is
not very risky). Our results come from the fact that the run-proof
contract reduces the consumption of impatient agents, even in
the presence of the gambling asset. Then, for low probabilities of
success of the gambling asset, the allocation that allows for runs
and makes consumption indirectly contingent on the information
shock, is preferred. The beneﬁts of private monitoring of banks
have been emphasized by the empirical literature. For example,
Barth et al. (2004) ﬁnd, in an extensive study that examines various
bank regulations and supervisory practices in 107 countries, that
regulations that encourage private monitoring of banks are associ-
ated with better banking sector outcomes, greater bank develop-
ment, lower net-interest margins and small non-performing
loans. However, they also show that private monitoring does not
reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis.3
Market discipline has also been analyzed by several papers in
the theoretical banking literature, but in a single-bank economy
(where the interaction between bank runs and contagion is not
analyzed). The idea of these papers is that uninsured and liquid
deposits keep the bank’s portfolio choice in line with depositors’
preferences. The threat of a bank run by informed depositors after
receiving negative information discourages banks’ owners from
investing in projects that are too risky or committing fraud (see
Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Flannery, 1994; Jean-Baptiste, 1999 or
Gorton and Huang, 2003. Dwyer and Samartín, 2009 contains a re-
view of this literature).4 In our paper, market discipline is exercised
by depositors that withdraw their deposits in order to punish banks
for bad behavior. On the other hand, we follow one strand of the con-
tagion literature that motivates the existence of contagion through
the interbank market. A common feature of this literature is that
banks have incentives to establish links ex ante, in order to protect
themselves against liquidity shocks, but during a crisis, the failure
of one institution may have negative effects on other institutions
to which it is linked (see Allen and Gale, 2000; Brusco and Castiglio-
nesi, 2007; Castiglionesi, 2007; Hasman and Samartín, 2008).5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the basic model is
presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes the socially-optimal
allocation. Section 4 analyzes the decentralized solution under dif-
ferent scenarios and Section 5 provides some welfare comparisons
using numerical simulations. Finally, the concluding remarks are
summarized in Section 6.2. The model
The model builds on Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007). There a
three dates (t = 0,1,2) and a single good. There are two regions, A
and B. Each region has a continuum of depositors and a banking
sector. Depositors are ex-ante identical and are endowed with
one unit of the good at t = 0. At t = 1, individuals can be of type-1
(or impatient) with probability ws and derive utility from con-
sumption only in that period, or they can be of type-2 (or patient)ﬁnd that contagion is possible but unlikely, that the size of the failing bank as well as
the direction and type of linkages are key factors in determining the probability of
contagion. One limitation of most of theses studies is that due to the lack of
information on bank’s mutual exposure, they have to assume a given distribution of
interbank linkages. See Allen and Babus (2008), or European Central Bank (2010).
Fig. 1. Sequence of events.
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at t = 2. The probabilityws is also the fraction of impatient consum-
ers in the population of region i (i = A,B), and ws can take two val-
ues wH and wL, with wH >wL and equal probabilities. The average
fraction of impatient consumers is c ¼ wHþwL2 .
The depositor’s utility function is as follows:
Uðc1; c2Þ ¼
uðc1Þ with probability ws ðType 1Þ
uðc2Þ with probability ð1wsÞ ðType 2Þ

ð1Þ
Where the utility function u(.) is deﬁned over non-negative levels of
consumption, is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continu-
ously differentiable, and satisﬁes Inada conditions. Consumer’s type
is his private information. The regions have perfect negative corre-
lated liquidity shocks.
Finally, we consider risk-neutral investors (or bankers) en-
dowed with e units of the consumption good at t = 0. These inves-
tors can either consume (do) or buy shares from the banks, in such
case they receive dividends ~dt at t = 1, 2. Their utility function is as
follows:
Uðdo; ~d1; ~d2Þ ¼ Rdo þ ~d1 þ ~d2 ð2Þ
Note that since investors obtain a utility of R e by immediate con-
sumption, they have to be rewarded at least R for each unit of con-
sumption they give up today. The incentive constraint is then:
d1 + d2P Re.
The banking sector in each region has access to long-term
investment opportunities, and so individuals will deposit their
endowment in the banking sector, in order to exploit those oppor-
tunities. Also, as liquidity shocks are negatively correlated across
regions, banks are interested in maintaining interbank deposits
to protect themselves against the liquidity shock.6
There are three types of assets or opportunities available to the
bank in each region: the ﬁrst one takes one unit of the consump-
tion good at t and transforms it into one unit at t + 1 (storage or
short asset), the second one is a long-term but safe asset that takes
one unit at t = 0 and transforms it into R units at t = 2 with cer-
tainty. Finally, there is a second long-term asset, the gambling asset,
that transforms one unit at t = 0 into R units with probability g and
0 with probability (1  g), at t = 2. Both of the long-term technolo-
gies cannot be liquidated prematurely at t = 1, or equivalently,
their liquidation value is close to zero. In order to introduce the
moral hazard problem, it is assumed that the gambling asset pro-
duces an unobservable return (k  1)R, for each unit invested at
t = 0, with k > 1 and pk < 1. Additionally, due to the limited liability
assumption, depositors receive zero when the gambling asset does
not succeed. Finally, it is also assumed that the opportunity of
investing in the gambling asset appears with probability p and is
not veriﬁable.7
To complete the argument, we will consider that a proportion a
(where 0 6 a 6 1) of type-2 depositors become informed and they
can observe whether the opportunity to invest in the gambling as-
set appears in their own bank but not in the bank in the other
region.86 For a motivation and description of the interbank market, see Allen and Gale
(2000).
7 As in Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007), the moral hazard problem cannot be solved
through contracts, since outside parties cannot observe the investment choice of the
bank or the extra return that it produces.
8 We can think that these informed depositors represent large uninsured depos-
itors, that are not completely covered by the insurance fund, as well as other type of
credit holders in countries where the institutional and regulatory environment
enhance market discipline. On the other hand, it is true that there can be coordination
problems among debt holders. That is why we assume a sequential service constraint.
As Calomiris and Khan (1991) show the ﬁrst come ﬁrst served basis avoids that
depositors free ride on each other, as they always have an incentive to be ﬁrst in line
to get paid. Note also, that when a? 0 we are in BC framework.This assumption is motivated by the fact that if information
were costly, type-2 depositors would be more likely to acquire
information. Furthermore, if depositors were partially insured,
large depositors would also be more likely to acquire the costly sig-
nal. These unmodeled aspects are taken into account by assuming
that a fraction of type-2 depositors becomes informed. See Jacklin
and Bhattacharya (1988) for a motivation of this assumption.
Finally, the sequence of events is as follows: at t = 0, agents in-
vest their endowment in banks. Banks then distribute this amount
between the short and the long-term investments. Next, the oppor-
tunity to invest in the gambling asset appears with probability p. At
t = 1, agents decide whether to withdraw their money from banks
(given the liquidity and information shocks). At t = 2, the long-term
project matures and patient depositors are paid. Fig. 1 illustrates
the timing of the model.
3. The social planner problem
As a useful benchmark, we will ﬁrst analyze the ﬁrst-best allo-
cation. Since consumers are ex-ante identical, it is natural to treat
consumers symmetrically. We can therefore focus on the represen-
tative consumer in each region. Additionally, as there is no aggre-
gate uncertainty, the optimal consumption will be independent of
the state.
Clearly, in the Pareto optimal allocation there will be no gam-
bling. Hence, the amount of capital owned by the risk-neutral
investors is indeterminate. However, in the following sections, it
is shown that the amount of capital does play a role in the decen-
tralized economy.
The problem to be solved by a social planner is the following
one:
Max
fx;y;c1 ;c2g
cuðc1Þ þ ð1 cÞuðc2Þ ð3Þ
s:t:
xþ y 6 1; ð4Þ
cc1 6 y; ð5Þ
ð1 cÞc2 6 Rx; ð6Þ
x; y; c1; c2 P 0 ð7Þ
where y is the amount invested in the short-term asset (storage), x
are resources invested in the long-term safe technology, c1 is the
consumption offered to an impatient consumer and c2 is the con-
sumption of a patient one.
Eq. (3) is the expected utility to be maximized. Eq. (4) is the
budget constraint at t = 0, that states that all resources should be
used in storage or investment. Eq. (5) is the ﬁrst-period constraint,
which says that all the resources from storage should be used to
pay the impatient depositor. Eq. (6) is the second-period con-
straint, where resources invested in the long-term technology are
used to pay the patient depositor. Liquid funds might be rolled over
from the ﬁrst period but since the long-term technology is certain
and strictly positive, rollover is ruled out.
Optimality requires that the feasibility constraints are satisﬁed
with equality, so we can write the problem as
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y½0;1
cu
y
c
 
þ ð1 cÞu 1 y
1 cR
 
ð8Þ
Since u(.) is strictly concave and satisﬁes the Inada conditions, the
solution to problem (8) is unique and interior. The optimal value
y⁄(0,1) is obtained from the ﬁrst-order condition
u0
y
c
 
¼ Ru0 1 y

1 c R
 
ð9Þ
and once y⁄ has been determined by Eq. (9) we can use the feasibil-
ity constraints to determine the other variables:
c1 ¼
y
c
; c2 ¼
ð1 yÞ
1 c R; x
 ¼ 1 y ð10Þ
Notice that (9) and (10) imply that u0 c1
  ¼ Ru0 c2 , which in turn
implies u0 c1
 
> u0 c2
 
and c2 > c

1. Thus, the ﬁrst-best allocation
automatically satisﬁes the incentive constraint c2P c1, that is the
late consumer has no incentive to behave as the early one. We will
call W  y; x; c1; c2
 
the ﬁrst-best allocation, and U⁄ the expected
utility achieved under the ﬁrst-best allocation.
4. Decentralized economy
4.1. No moral hazard
When banks are sufﬁciently capitalized, there is no gambling, or
equivalently, moral hazard is restrained and the ﬁrst-best alloca-
tion can be attained by a decentralized economy, where the banks
in both regions exchange interbank deposits at t = 0.9
Formally, we can state the following result:
Proposition 1 Brusco and Castiglionesi, 2007. The bank will invest
in the long-safe asset only if the bank’s capital is sufﬁciently large.
When there is no moral hazard problem, the ﬁrst-best allocation can
be implemented by a decentralized banking system offering demand
deposits.
The intuition is that when the amount of capital is large, bankers
are more reluctant to gamble with their own money, and so they will
invest in the safe asset.
The ﬁrst-best allocation can be achieved as follows: at t = 0, banks
exchange interbank deposits for an amount (wH  c) and offer the
ﬁrst-best contract c1; c

2; x
; y
 
to their depositors and to the bank in
the other region (interbank deposits pay as the rest of deposits). At
t = 1, when a bank turns out to have the high-liquidity shock it
liquidates interbank deposits held in the other bank. In the second
year, interbank deposits move in the opposite direction, and so the
low-liquidity bank receives deposits from the high-liquidity bank. In
this way, by shifting deposits across regions, banks are able to satisfy
the budget constraints, given by Eqs. (4)–(6), and provide depositors
with the ﬁrst-best allocation.4.2. Moral hazard with no information
As we are interested in analyzing the effect of information and
depositor monitoring on ﬁnancial contagion, we assume for the
rest of the paper that the exogenous amount of capital is scarce
and so banks in both regions have incentives to invest in the gam-
bling asset.10 Also, banks will exchange interbank deposits at t = 0,
for an amount k, in order to protect themselves against the liquidity
shock. At t = 1, the high-liquidity bank retrieves deposits from the
low-liquidity bank in the other region. At t = 2, deposits move in9 The problem of decentralized economies in autarky is not solved in this paper, as
we are interested in the effect of moral hazard issues and information in the
propagation of crises among regions. For a description of that problem see BC.
10 The formal condition for banks to gamble is derived in BC.the opposite direction, and so the low-liquidity bank pays back its
deposits to the high-liquidity bank. It is assumed that banks can offer
contracts contingent on the liquidity shock, although not on the
appearance of the gambling asset. We then deﬁne by cst the con-
sumption offered to a type-t consumer (with t = 1,2) in state s (with
s = L,H). We also assume that interbank deposits pay the same as the
rest of deposits. For example, at t = 1, the high-liquidity bank will re-
trieve kcL1 from the low-liquidity bank. At t = 2, the high-liquidity
bank will pay kcH2 to the low-liquidity one.
Note that consumption in the second period, will depend on the
probability of bank failure in each region. For each region, let
q = (1  p) + gp be the probability that the gambling asset does
not appear or that it appears and succeeds; while (1  q) = p(1  g)
is the probability that the gambling asset appears and fails. When
the region experiences a high-liquidity shock, second-period con-
sumption is just affected by what happens in that region. In this
case, depositors receive the promised consumption cH2 , with prob-
ability q and cA2, which comes from funds available from storage (if
any), when the gambling asset appears and fails, with probability
1  q. If the region is affected by a low-liquidity shock, consump-
tion in the second period is affected by what happens in both re-
gions. We deﬁne by cc2 the consumption of a patient depositor in
the low-liquidity region when its long-term investment is success-
ful and the bank in the other region (say B) fails. In this case, bank A
cannot retrieve completely the interbank deposit, and so there is
contagion from region B to region A. This happens with probability
q(1  q), cF2 is the consumption of a patient depositor in the low-
liquidity region when its own investment fails, but that of the
other region does not. In this case, the available funds to pay
depositors are those obtained from the interbank market and from
storage (if any). This also happens with probability (1  q)q. When
both regions’ investments fail, which happens with probability
(1  q)2, then there is a meltdown of the entire ﬁnancial system,
and depositors receive cB2 (which is zero, if there is no storage from
t = 1 to t = 2). Finally, when both investments are successful depos-
itors receive the promised payment cL2. This happens with probabil-
ity q2.
Let us call WMH ¼ cst ; cA2; cc2; cF2; cB2; x; y; k; dst
 
the allocation when
moral hazard is present, and UMH the expected utility achieved
with moral hazard and no information.
The complete characterization of the optimal problem is pro-
vided in Appendix A. This is the original problem solved in BC.
The following result is obtained.
Proposition 2. If p? 0, the expected utility achieved under moral
hazard (UMH) tends to the ﬁrst-best optimum (U
⁄). Therefore, for a
sufﬁciently low p a contract that allows for gambling will be preferred
to one that prevents moral hazard by restricting banks to be
sufﬁciently capitalized.Proof. See Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007). h
The intuition is that the contract where moral hazard is pre-
vented, does not reach the ﬁrst best, as it restricts the amount of
the long-term investment, with respect to the optimal one. Recall
that as the exogenous amount of capital is scarce, the only way
to increase capital is by increasing reserves and hence the amount
invested in the long-term asset is decreased. Additionally, in this
latter case the value of the expected utility does not depend on
p. Therefore, for a sufﬁciently low p gambling is preferred.
4.3. Moral hazard with information: bank runs
The discussion of the previous section ignored the fact that
agents could acquire information about the bank’s investment. In
3080 A. Hasman et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3076–3084particular, we assume that banks offer the contract described by
WMH. At t = 1, a fraction of late depositors receives information
about whether the opportunity to invest in the gambling asset ap-
pears in their own bank. These informed depositors will run on the
bank whenever the expected utility of waiting is lower than the ex-
pected utility of withdrawing their deposits from the bank.
Formally, the incentive compatibility constraints are as follows:
g qu cL2
 þ ð1 qÞu cc2  þ ð1 gÞ qu cF2 þ ð1 qÞu cB2  P u cL1 
ð11Þ
gu cH2
 þ ð1 gÞu cA2 P u cH1  ð12Þ
These equations state that when an informed depositor observes
that the gambling asset has appeared, he has no incentives to with-
draw in the low and high-liquidity regions, respectively. Eq. (11)
states that the expected utility of a patient depositor in a low-
liquidity bank is higher when he waits than when he withdraws
at t = 1. The equation is interpreted as follows: when the gambling
asset succeeds in the low-liquidity bank (which happens with prob-
ability g), if in the other bank the gambling asset does not appear or
appears and succeeds (which happens with probability q), the
depositor receives cL2. However, when the gambling asset in the
other region fails, then depositors receive the lower amount of cC2,
as the low-liquidity bank is not able to retrieve its interbank deposit
with the other bank. Similarly, when the gambling asset fails in the
low-liquidity region (with probability 1  g), if in the other bank
the gambling asset does not appear or appears and succeeds, the
bank can use the available funds from the interbank market to
pay depositors, and so the depositor receives cF2, whereas if the gam-
bling asset appears and fails the depositor just receives cB2 (which is
zero, when there is no storage from t = 1 to t = 2). Eq. (12) has a sim-
ilar interpretation. It represents the expected utility of a patient
depositor in a high-liquidity bank. Recall that in this case, second-
period consumption is just affected by what happens in this bank.
When the gambling asset succeeds in the high-liquidity bank,
(which happens with probability g) the depositor receives cH2 , while
when the gambling asset fails, the depositor just receives cA2 (which
is zero if there is no storage).
In the discussion that follows, we assume that the value of g is
such that the above incentive constraints are never satisﬁed. For-
mally, the condition for depositors to run on the bank is summa-
rized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Let g^ be the level of g for which the more restrictive of the
two incentive constraints (11) and (12) is satisﬁed. Then, for g < g^,
the incentive constraints are violated and there are runs.We assume, that the value of g is sufﬁciently low (below g^), so
there are always runs.11 Let us describe the sequence of events at
date t = 1. First, banks observe the liquidity shock and withdraw
interbank deposits when its region results to be in the high-liquidity
demand one. Then, the appearance of the gambling asset is observed
by informed depositors and ﬁnally, impatient and informed deposi-
tors withdraw their money from banks.
As the type of the consumer is private information, the bank
cannot distinguish whether the withdrawal is due to liquidity is-
sues or information induced ones. Additionally, agents arrive at
the bank and are paid sequentially, therefore, this ﬁrst-come-
ﬁrst-served service plus the illiquidity of the long-term invest-
ment, makes the bank subject to runs whenever the proportion
of withdrawals at t = 1 is greater than ws (s = L,H).11 In this paper, we focus on essential bank runs, that is, bank runs that cannot be
avoided, and hence the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a bank run is that the
incentive constraint be violated. We then rule out pure-panic runs of the Diamond
and Dybvig type. See Allen and Gale (2007) for a discussion of this issue.Let the probability of being paid in state s, when the gambling
asset appears, be qs ¼ w
s
að1wsÞþws, where the numerator represents
total supply and the denominator total demand. So with probabil-
ity qs(s = L,H), type-1 and informed type-2 depositors receive cs1,
and with probability (1  q s) they will receive zero.12
The ex-ante expected utility when there is a run, bUðpÞ, is as
follows:
bU ¼1p
2
wHu cH1
 þ 1wH u cH2 þwLu cL1 	
þ 1wLÞ ð1pÞu cL2
 þpu cc2   
þp2 wH qHu cH1 þð1qHÞuð0Þ 	
þ 1wHÞ aqHu cH1
 þ að1qHÞþð1aÞ½ uð0Þ	 

þwL qLu cL1
 þð1qLÞuð0Þ þð1wLÞ aqLu cL1 	
þ að1qLÞþð1aÞ½ uð0Þgg ð13Þ
Let us consider the case of a depositor in region A, that is symmet-
rical to that of a depositor in region B. If the gambling asset does not
appear and region A faces a high-liquidity shock, consumption in
both periods is as promised cHt ; t ¼ 1;2
 
. This explains the ﬁrst
row of the objective function. However, when region A faces a
low-liquidity shock and in region B there was a bank run at t = 1
(which occurs with probability p), the bank in region A will be af-
fected by contagion at t = 2 since it cannot retrieve its interbank
deposits, and so patient depositors receive the lower amount cc2.
This gives the second row of the objective function. The other rows
present the case where the gambling asset appears in region A (the
one we are considering as home) and so the bank in region A is af-
fected by a bank run. As mentioned above, in this case, with prob-
ability qs type-1 and informed type-2 receive cs1 and with
probability (1  qs) they receive zero.
Let us call WRUNS ¼ cstR; cA2R; cc2R; cF2R; cB2R; xR; yR; kR; dstR
 
the alloca-
tion with bank runs, and bU the expected utility achieved.
The complete characterization of the optimal problem is pro-
vided in Appendix B. The optimal consumption levels are obtained
maximizing the ex-ante expected utility with runs, subject to the
resource and the banker’s incentive compatibility constraints.4.4. Moral hazard with information: the run-proof contract
We now consider a contract which ensures bank runs will not
occur, as a result of the negative information shock. This contract
solves the same problem as the one in subsection 4.2 with two
additional incentive constraints given by Eqs. (11) and (12). We
call the result to the bank’s optimization problem, when bank runs
are avoided, the run-proof contract.
This run-proof contract guarantees that the incentive compati-
bility constraints are always satisﬁed. Essentially, what the con-
tract does is to reduce ﬁrst-period consumption so there are no
runs.
Note that this contract allows bankers to gamble with deposi-
tors’ funds and maintain their investments until t = 2. However,
as it is shown later, the run-proof contract might not be optimal.
In some cases, it is welfare improving to allow bank runs. This
comparison is missing in BC paper. In their case, with no informa-
tion, there are never runs, and the banks would always gamble and
maintain their investment until t = 2 (for a sufﬁciently low p).
Let us call WRP ¼ cstRP; cA2RP; cc2RP; cF2RP; cB2RP; xRP; yRP; kRP; dstRP
 
the
allocation when banks offer the run-proof contract and eUðp;g) the
expected utility achieved.
This contract is presented in Appendix C.12 Recall that the long-term investment is illiquid, or equivalently, that its
liquidation value is close to zero.
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A comparison between the allocation that allows for runs, and
the run-proof contract is summarized in the proposition below.
For a similar type of analysis, in a single-bank economy without
moral hazard, see Alonso (1996).
Proposition 3. Let g < g^ be the level of g, for which the expected
utility with both contracts, the run-proof contract and the one that
allows for runs is equalized, that is, bU ¼ eU. For values of g < g⁄ and a
sufﬁciently low p, the allocation that allows for runs at t = 1 (and
hence punishes banks by forcing liquidation and not allowing banks to
operate until t = 2) is preferred to the run-proof contract. For
g < g 6 g^, the run-proof contract is preferred.Proof. The idea of the proof is to analyze the values that both func-
tions take at the extreme points g = 0 and g ¼ g^, in order to see
whether both functions intersect.
First, we demonstrate that for any p > 0 (but small), when g = 0,
the expected utility with bank runs is higher than in the run-proof
case. In order to show this, note that when p? 0, the optimal
contract with bank runs (Appendix B) becomes identical to the
problem deﬁned in Appendix A (moral hazard without informa-
tion). From Proposition 2, we know that this latter contract
achieves the ﬁrst best, and hence the optimal contract with bank
runs would also be optimal. On the other side, the run-proof
contract will not achieve the ﬁrst best when p? 0, as it considers
the two additional incentive constraints (11) and (12) (which affect
consumption even in the absence of appearance of the gambling
asset). Hence, this demonstrates that for a sufﬁciently low p the
expected utility with bank runs should be higher, at the extreme
point g = 0.
Second, when g ¼ g^, then we know from Lemma 1 that there
are no runs, that is, the incentive compatibility constraints are
automatically satisﬁed. Therefore, at this point, individuals would
be strictly worse off by running on the bank, and so the contract
with bank runs would be dominated.13 In fact, the only relevant
contract is the run-proof one.
Finally, we show that the expected utility with bank runs is
independent of g,14 while the expected utility in the run-proof case
is increasing in g. This can be seen by comparing Eq. (13) (the
expected utility with bank runs) with Eq. (15), expected utility in the
run-proof case. Then, as the expected utility with runs is independent
of g, while the expected utility in the run-proof case is increasing in
g15 this demonstrates that the functions should intersect at some
point g < g^, that is, there exists a threshold value of g;g < g^, for
which the two utility functions are equalized. h
Consequently, for values of gP g⁄, banks are allowed to gamble
and maintain the investment until t = 2 (as in BC). Our paper shows
that when information is introduced and the gambling asset is ris-
ky ðg < g^Þ, the incentive constraints should be taken into account.
In fact, for certain parameter values, it is welfare improving to run
on banks (g < g⁄).
Finally, there are differences in the channel of contagion in the
two scenarios. When bank runs are allowed contagion is due to the13 Note that the optimal contract with bank runs, penalizes some of the type-1
agents that arrive late to the bank.
14 Bank runs occur at t = 1 for every g < g^, and so the expected utility with bank
runs just depends on the probability of appearance of the gambling asset p.
15 Note that in Eq. (15), q = 1  p + pg. Focusing on the maximization problem
deﬁned in Appendix C (run-proof contract), it can be seen that as g increases, the
incentive compatibility constraints (11) and (12) become less restrictive, and
consequently the expected utility with the run-proof contract increases. Moreover,
as g increases aggregate uncertainty decreases, the expected return increases and so
the expected utility also increases.interaction of bad investments and information while in the run-
proof contract it is just a cascade effect (as in BC).5. Welfare comparisons: numerical examples
In order to explore the relevance of Propositions 2 and 3, some
numerical simulations are carried out.
The following utility function is assumed:
UiðciÞ ¼ ðg þ ciÞ
1d
1 d d > 1; k > 0
i ¼ 1;2
ð14Þ
where g is a positive constant and d the relative risk aversion
coefﬁcient.16
Fig. 2 simulates Proposition 2, derived in BC.17 The ﬁgure dis-
plays the expected utility with moral hazard, and the expected
utility achieved when moral hazard is prevented by restricting
long-term investment. It can be seen that the critical probability
of success of the gambling asset above which moral hazard should
be restrained is approximately 0.30. Additionally, in all simula-
tions, we have consistently checked for this critical probability,
in order to ensure that for the assumed value of p the simulations
are relevant.
Fig. 3 simulates Proposition 3. The ﬁgure represents the ex-
pected utility achieved both when bank runs are allowed and in
the run-proof contract, as a function of the probability of success
of the gambling asset. The ﬁgure displays the critical g⁄, for which
both utilities are equalized. It can be seen that g⁄ = 0.73. Then, for
values of g < g⁄ it is welfare improving to run on banks. On the con-
trary, when g > g⁄, the best contract is one that prevents bank
runs.18 The logic behind gambling for values of g > 0.73 is that the
probability of the bad state (default) is quite small (so g high). In
other words, in these cases, the asset is not very risky, and so it wel-
fare improving to maintain the investment, or equivalently, to
gamble.
Figs. 4–6 carry out comparative statics. The idea is to determine
the variation of the critical probability of success of the gambling
asset, g⁄, as a function of the model parameters. In Fig. 4, all param-
eters remain constant, except for the relative risk-aversion coefﬁ-
cient, which has increased to d = 4.0. By comparing Figs. 3 and 4,
it can be seen that the critical probability is increasing in risk aver-
sion (g⁄ = 0.87). Then, as individuals become more risk averse, they
are more reluctant to allow the bank to gamble and maintain their
investment (the run-proof contract), and so the contract that al-
lows for runs is preferred for a larger set of parameters. Similarly,
Fig. 5 carries out the same comparison for a higher value of the re-
turn, R = 1.8. Again, comparing Figs. 3 and 5, it can be seen that the
critical probability is decreasing in the return (g⁄ = 0.69). This is be-
cause when the long-term asset is more productive depositors are
more willing to continue the investment, and so the run-proof con-
tract is preferred for a larger set of parameters. Finally, Fig. 6 shows
the expected utility with both contracts when the average propor-
tion of impatient consumers decreases to c = 0.4. It can be also ob-
served that the critical probability increases (g⁄ = 0.75), which
reﬂects the fact that bank run allocation penalizes type-1 consum-
ers relatively more than type-2 consumers, as with bank runs some
type-1 consumers are rationed at t = 1. Therefore, when the aver-
age proportion of type-1 consumers decreases, the bank-run con-
tract is preferred for a larger set of parameters.16 The positive constant g keeps the objective function bounded for all weakly
positive consumption levels.
17 The optimization problems have been programmed and solved with GAMS.
18 Note that all ﬁgures have been simulated up to the point where g ¼ g^. In fact, at
this point, the expected utility with bank runs is not deﬁned.
Fig. 2. Expected utility with moral hazard and without moral hazard as a function
of the probability of appearance of the gambling asset p (Proposition 2).
Fig. 3. Expected utility achieved with runs and without runs as a function of the
probability of success of the gambling asset g (Proposition 3).
Fig. 4. Expected utility achieved with runs and without runs as a function of the
probability of success of the gambling asset, and higher risk aversion (d = 4.00).
Fig. 5. Expected utility achieved with runs and without runs as a function of the
probability of success of the gambling asset and higher return (R = 1.8).
Fig. 6. Expected utility achieved with runs and without runs as a function of the
probability of success of the gambling asset and lower average proportion of
impatient consumers (c = 0.4).
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to gamble and maintain the investment, when the gambling asset
is relatively safe. We see that the critical probability is increasing in
the level of risk aversion and it is decreasing in the long-term re-
turn and in the proportion of type-1 consumers.6. Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes market discipline in a many-bank economy
where contagion and bank runs interact. In particular, we build on
the model by Brusco and Castiglionesi (BC), but we modify their
framework by introducing the possibility of differently-informed
depositors. In BC framework, moral hazard arises due to the exis-
tence of undercapitalized banks and no informed depositors. They
show that for certain parameter values, depositors prefer a con-
tract that allows banks to gamble with their money to one that re-
stricts banks to be sufﬁciently capitalized, in order to avoid the
moral hazard problem.
We show that if depositors have incentives to acquire informa-
tion, negative information induces depositors to run on banks.
Therefore, in order to avoid runs (and allow banks to gamble and
maintain the investment) two additional constraints need to be
imposed in the bank maximization problem. We refer to this con-
tract as the run-proof contract. We then derive the threshold prob-
ability of success of the gambling asset, g⁄, for which two contracts,
the run-proof contract and the contract that allows for runs, deliver
the same expected utility. For probabilities below the threshold va-
lue (g < g⁄) it is welfare improving to run on banks. Overall, depos-
itors will only allow banks to gamble with their money, when the
probability of success of the gambling asset is sufﬁciently high (the
asset is not very risky).
Both when banks are allowed to gamble and maintain the
investment or when there is a run, the contagion effect remains
small. This result is very important as it is precisely during crises,
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(in fear of a systemic crisis) and thus weaken market discipline.
Our results suggest that, in certain circumstances, allowing for
runs (and hence contagion) might be welfare superior to maintain-
ing risky banks operating. Finally, there are differences in the chan-
nel of contagion, in the two scenarios. When bank runs are allowed
contagion is due to the interaction of bad investments and infor-
mation while in the run-proof contract it is just a cascade effect.
The results of our paper emphasize the importance of informa-
tion and private monitoring in promoting market discipline.
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Appendix A
The problem to be solved, in the absence of information and
when capital is scarce, is the following one19:
max
x;y;k; cst ;d
s
tf gs¼L;Ht¼1;2
eU ¼ 1
2
wHu cH1
 þ ð1wHÞ qu cH2 þ ð1 qÞu cA2  	 

þ 1
2
wLu cL1
 þ ð1wLÞq qu cL2 þ ð1 qÞu cc2  	 

þ 1
2
ð1wLÞð1 qÞ qu cF2
 þ ð1 qÞu cB2  
ð15Þ
subject to
nxP e; ð16Þ
wHcH1 þ dH1 6 yþ kicL1 ð17Þ
ð1wHÞcA2 6 yþ kicL1 wHcH1  dH1
 
 kjcA2 ð18Þ
ð1wHÞcH2 þ dH2 6 Rxþ yþ kicL1 wHcH1  dH1
 
 kjcH2 ð19Þ
wLcL1 þ dL1 6 y kjcL1 ð20Þ
ð1wLÞcL2 þ dL2 6 Rxþ y kjcL1 wLcL1  dL1
 
þ kicH2 ð21Þ
ð1wLÞcc2 6 Rxþ y kjcL1 wLcL1  dL1
 
þ kicA2 ð22Þ
ð1wLÞcF2 6 y kjcL1 wLcL1  dL1
 
þ kicH2 ð23Þ
ð1wLÞcB2 6 y kjcL1 wLcL1  dL1
 
þ kicA2 ð24Þ
1
2
dH1 þ qdH2
 
þ 1
2
dL1 þ q2dL2
 
þ pðk 1ÞRxP eR ð25Þ
kP 0; cA2 P 0; c
c
2 P 0; c
F
2 P 0; c
B
2 P 0 ð26Þ
dst P 0; c
s
t P 0; where s ¼ L;H and t ¼ 1;2 ð27Þ
yþ x ki þ kj 6 1þ e; xP 0; yP 0; ð28Þ
where ki represents interbank deposits given to the other bank and
kj interbank deposits received from the other bank, (with ki = kj = k),
cst is the consumption offered to a type t consumer (with t = 1,2) in
state s (with s = L, H). We deﬁne as cA2 the consumption of a patient
depositor in a high-liquidity region, when its own investment fails
and so all the available funds are those from storage (if any), cc2 is19 This is a revised version of the original problem solved by Brusco and
Castiglionesi (2007, pp. 2299–2300).the consumption of a patient depositor in the low-liquidity region
when its long-term investment is successful and the bank in the
other region (say B) fails. In this case, bank A cannot retrieve com-
pletely the interbank deposit, and so there is contagion from region
B to region A, cF2 is the consumption of a patient depositor in the
low-liquidity region when its own investment fails, but that of
the other region does not. In this case, the available funds to pay
depositors are those obtained from the interbank market and from
storage (if any). When both regions’ investments fail, which hap-
pens with probability (1  q)2, then there is a meltdown of the en-
tire ﬁnancial system, and depositors receive cB2. Finally, d
s
t are
dividends received by the capitalist at t = 1, 2 in state s (with
s = L,H).
The interpretation of this problem is as follows20: Eq. (15) is the
expected utility to be maximized. The ﬁrst row of the optimization
program is the expected utility of a depositor when the region has
the high-liquidity shock at t = 1. Note that in this case second-period
consumption is not affected by what happens in the other region.
The second and third rows represent the expected utility of a depos-
itor when the region is affected by a low-liquidity shock at t = 1. In
this case, second-period consumption is affected by what happens
in the other region.
Eq. (16) states that the bank is insufﬁciently capitalized, and so
it has incentives to invest in the gambling asset. Eq. (17) is the ﬁrst-
period constraint in a high-liquidity region while Eqs. (18) and (19)
are the second-period constraints in this high-liquidity region. Eq.
(20) is the ﬁrst-period constraint in a low-liquidity region while
Eqs. (21)–(24) are second-period constraints for a low-liquidity re-
gion, depending on what has happened in the other region.
Eq. (25) is the participation constraint for investors. It is ex-
plained as follows: with probability 1/2 the bank will have a
high-liquidity shock, and the capitalist receives the second-period
dividend if the gambling asset does not appear or it appears and
succeeds (which occurs with probability q). With probability 1/2
the bank will have a low-liquidity shock, and in this case the cap-
italist receives the second-period dividend if in both regions either
the gambling assets do not appear or they appear and succeed
(which happens with probability q2). Finally, when the gambling
asset appears the capitalist retains the amount (k  1)R x. Eqs.
(26) and (27) present the nonnegativity constraints. Finally, the
budget constraint at t = 0is given by Eq. (28).Appendix B. Optimal contract with bank runs
The optimal consumption levels are obtained maximizing the
ex-ante expected utility with runs, subject to the resource and
incentive compatibility constraints, (16)–(28). The problem to be
solved, when bank runs are allowed is as follows:max
x;y;k; cst ;d
s
tf gs¼L;Ht¼1;2
bU ¼ 1 p
2
wHu cH1
 þ ð1wHÞu cH2 þwLu cL1 	
þ 1wLÞ ð1 pÞu cL2
 þ pu cc2   

þ p
2
wH qHu c
H
1
 þ ð1 qHÞuð0Þ 	
þ 1wHÞ aqHu cH1
 þ að1 qHÞ þ ð1 aÞ½ uð0Þ	 

þwL qLu cL1
 þ ð1 qLÞuð0Þ þ ð1wLÞ aqLu cL1 	
þ að1 qLÞ þ ð1 aÞ½ uð0Þgg ð29Þsubject to
(16)–(28).20 For a detailed description of the problem see Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007).
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The problem to be solved, when banks offer the run-proof con-
tract is identical to that of Appendix B, with two additional incen-
tive compatibility constraints, that is:
Max. (15).
subject to.
(16)–(28)
and
g qu cL2
 þð1qÞu cc2  þð1gÞ qu cF2 þð1qÞu cB2   P u cL1 
ð30Þ
gu cH2
 þð1gÞu cA2 P u cH1  ð31Þ
All the optimization problems have been programmed and solved
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